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The early 1970's witnessed the Congressional adoption of
numerous federal statutes aimed at combating major crimes. Two
prominent statutory schemes, the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations Act (RICO)1 and the Comprehensive Drug Abuse
Prevention and Control Act (Controlled Substances Act), were
enacted in 1970.2 The RICO Act was designed to. halt organized
crime infiltration into the American economy. The Controlled Sub-
stances Act, on the other hand, via its "Kingpin" provision,8 enables
the United States Attorney to target the operators of continuing ille-
gal drug enterprises.
The language and scope of these statutes is very broad. For
instance, a defendant is guilty under the Kingpin statute (Section
848) if:
(1) he violates any provision of this subchapter or subchapter II
of this chapter the punishment for which is a felony, and
(2) such violation is a part of a continuing series of violations of
this subchapter or subchapter II of this chapter -
(A) which are undertaken by such person in concert with five or
more other persons with respect to whom such person occupies
a position of organizer, a supervisory position, or any other
position of management, and
(B) from which such person obtains substantial income or
resources.4
© 1987 by Phillip H. Cherney
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1. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1970).
2. 21 U.S.C. §§ 801-969 (1970).
3. 21 U.S.C. § 848 (1970).
4. The applicable text of section 848 is as follows:
(a) Penalties; forfeitures
(1) Any person who engages in a continuing criminal enterprise shall be
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Severe penalties are imposed for a conviction under either of
these two acts. For example, offenders are denied parole and may be
sentenced for a minimum of ten years to life imprisonment for a first
offense. Additionally, fines are originally set at $100,000 for first
time offenders, $200,000 for recidivists and criminal forfeiture penal-
ties may be imposed upon any proceeds or profits derived from the
illegal enterprise. Consequently, this legislation must be recognized
as one of the most dramatic penal weapons available to federal law
enforcement officials in the "war on drugs."
After nearly two decades in existence, section 848 (commonly
referred to as "CCE") has undergone extensive scrutiny and clarifi-
cation. Section 848 was marginally altered under the Comprehensive
Crime Control Act of 1984,' which concentrated on closing enter-
prise profit loopholes. Seventeen years of litigation have defined
many of the elements of a CCE violation, including substantive in-
quiries such as what constitutes a "series of violations." Moreover,
numerous constitutional issues have been fleshed-out, including those
relating to vagueness and cruel and unusual punishment.6
sentenced to a term of imprisonment which may not be less than 10 years and
which may be up to life imprisonment, to a fine of not more than $100,000, and
to the forfeiture prescribed in paragraph (2): except that if any person engages
in such activity after one or more prior convictions of him under this section
have become final, he shall be sentenced to a term of imprisonment which may
not be less than 20 years and which may be up to life imprisonment, to a fine of
not more than $200,000, and to the forfeiture prescribed in paragraph (2).
(b) Continuing Criminal Enterprise defined
For purposes of subsection (a) of this section, a person is engaged in a continu-
ing criminal enterprise if -
(1) he violates any provision of this subchapter or subchapter II of this
chapter the punishment for which is a felony, and
(2) such violation is a part of a continuing series of violations of this sub-
chapter or subchapter II of this chapter -
(A) which are undertaken by such person in concert with five or more
other persons with respect to whom such person occupies a position of orga-
nizer, a supervisory position, or any other position of management, and
(B) from which such person obtains substantial income or resources.
21 U.S.C. § 848 (1982).
5. Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1837 (1984).
6. See, e.g., United States v. Losada, 674 F.2d 167 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 457 U.S.
1125 (1982); Sperling v. United States, 692 F.2d 223 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 462 U.S.
1131 (1983); United States v. Maull, 806 F.2d 1340 (8th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct.
1352 (1987); United States v. Valenzuela, 596 F.2d 1361 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S.
865 (1979); United States v. Ordonez, 722 F.2d 530 (9th Cir. 1983); United States v. Dickey,
736 F.2d 571 (10th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1188 (1987); United States v. Cravero,
545 F.2d 406 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1100; United States v. Suquet, 551 F.
Supp. 1194 (N.D. Ill. 1982); United States v. Bergdoll, 412 F. Supp. 1308 (D. Del. 1976);
United States v. Collier, 358 F. Supp. 1351 (E.D. Mich. 1973).
THRICE IN JEOPARDY
However, one critical constitutional issue remains unsettled.
Recent proceedings demonstrate that federal prosecutors are willing
to risk violating the double jeopardy clause of the fifth amendment in
an effort to garner a CCE conviction. For instance, the fifth amend-
ment states that no person shall "be subject for the same offense to
be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb. . . ." In its simplest terms,
the double jeopardy clause prohibits the prosecution and punishment
of an individual for more than one offense arising from a single act.
The case of the United States v. Felix Wayne Mitchell8 highlights
the CCE double jeopardy issue.
Prior to Mitchell's indictment in February of 1983, prosecutors
were warned that a conviction based on the drug conspiracy statute9
would result in a fifth amendment violation if the same conviction
was also used to indict and convict Mitchell under the Kingpin stat-
ute.1 o Prosecutors intended to use a single net to indict and convict
Mitchell for a section 846 conspiracy and to prove the so-called
"predicate" felony of subsection (b), paragraph (1) of section 848.
To further aggravate the situation, three of the overt acts in further-
ance of the conspiracy were to be used to prove the "series"
violations required by (b)(2) of the Kingpin statute.
Felix Mitchell's case is worth examining for several reasons.
First, it illustrates the willingness of government attorneys to prose-
cute major drug traffickers at any cost, including the high price of
reversal mandated for violation of the fifth amendment.11 The
hyperbole that accompanied the Mitchell case includes reports that
the 69th Avenue Mob may have been "the best-organized drug dis-
pensary in the west." Additionally, in East Oakland's "land of out-
casts" it may have been no exaggeration to term Felix Mitchell's
brand of free-market capitalism "a stunning example of modern-day
corporate leadership . ..for much of his community, a symbol of
entrepreneurial ingenuity, managerial expertise - and unparalleled
7. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
8. 572 F. Supp. 709 (N.D. Cal. 1983). The notoriety of the "69th Avenue Mob" case
surfaced again during Mitchell's lavish Oakland funeral, receiving national news coverage.
Mitchell, sentenced to a life term, was fatally stabbed in his cell at the United States Peniten-
tiary, Leavenworth, Kansas, on August 22, 1986. His appeal had not reached decision at the
time of his death and was dismissed January 7, 1987; prosecution abates ab initio upon death.
See United States v. Oberlin, 718 F.2d 894, 896 (9th Cir. 1983).
9. The full text of 21 U.S.C. § 846 (1982) reads as follows: "Any person who attempts
or conspires to commit any offense defined in this subchapter is punishable by imprisonment
or fine or both which may not exceed the maximum punishment prescribed for the offense, the
commission of which was the object of the attempt or conspiracy."
10. 21 U.S.C § 848 (1970).
11. See Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967).
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success."" As a result of Mitchell's success, overzealous prosecutors
ran their own expensive form of self-destruction.
Second, the Mitchell prosecution represents an excellent exam-
ple of using the CCE to create a double jeopardy violation. Circuits
that have recognized the prospect for abridgement have been
afforded the luxury of more than one substantive "predicate" felony
conviction as a substitute for a section 846 conspiracy violation.1" In
Mitchell, on the other hand, there was but one avenue for prosecu-
tion as Mitchell was charged solely with a section 846 "predicate."
His is the only case where the 846 act was used to prove both the
"predicate" and the "series" violations.
Third, the United States Supreme Court provided a virtual
paint-by-numbers directive on how to avoid double jeopardy
violations when prosecuting sections 846 and 848 in tandem.1 4 Un-
fortunately, one influential circuit court misread these outlines,"5 and
another ignored them.' Those signals were in turn followed by
other courts. This spawned confusion and internecine conflict.1
Other circuits remain undecided. 8
Finally, the implementation of the CCE must be closely
examined in light of recent Congressional consideration (and rejec-
tion) of the death penalty and the prospect of mandatory life
sentences with million-dollar fines. 9 Examination is warranted for
any legislation of such magnitude, especially with its impact upon
the prosecution of Felix Mitchell, one of the most controversial
"kingpins" in recent times.2
12. Covino, How the 69th Avenue Mob Maximized Earnings in East Oakland, CAL.
MA., Nov. 1985, at 83.
13. See, e.g., United States v. Chiattello, 804 F.2d 415, 419-20 (7th Cir. 1986); United
States v. Michel, 588 F.2d 986, 1000-01 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 825 (1979); United
States v. Sterling, 742 F.2d 521, 526 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1099 (1985).
14. Jeffers v. United States, 432 U.S. 137, reh'g denied, 434 U.S. 880 (1977); Accord,
Garrett v. United States, 471 U.S. 773, 'reh'g denied, 106 S. Ct. 20 (1985).
15. United States v. Young, 745 F.2d 733, 750 (2d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S.
1084 (1985).
16. United States v. Middleton, 673 F.2d 31 (1st Cir. 1982).
17. See, e.g., United States v. Ricks, 802 F.2d 731 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct.
650 (1986) [hereinafter Ricks 1I]; United States v. Schuster 769 F.2d 337, 345 (6th Cir. 1985),
cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 1210 (1986); United States v. Lurz, 666 F.2d 69 (4th Cir. 1981), cert.
denied, 459 U.S. 843 (1982); United States v. Boldin, 772 F.2d 719 (11th Cir. 1985), cert.
denied, 106 S. Ct. 1269 (1986); United States v. Brantley, 733 F.2d 1429 (11th Cir. 1984),
cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1006 (1985); cf Chiattello, 804 F.2d at 420.
18. See cases, supra note 13.
19. See Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, Pub. L. 99-570, at Subtitle F, Continuing Drug
Enterprise Act of 1986, §§ 1252-53.
20. Cf Setterberg, Drugs and Justice in Oakland, CAL. LAW., May, 1986, at 36;
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II. LAYING THE FOUNDATION FOR DOUBLE JEOPARDY
PROTECTION
The common moral sentiment that no person should suffer
twice for a single act took a decidedly critical turn in this country
after the Revolution. "The most important event in the development
of double jeopardy was the occasion of its incorporation into the fed-
eral constitution. This occurrence represents the transformation of a
general maxim of English criminal law into a general rule of public
policy."21 Fifth amendment protection remains a guarantee against
government harassment and it continues to play an important role in
criminal jurisprudence:
In American criminal procedure, the outstanding fact is the pre-
dominant role of the public prosecutor. This has made the
double jeopardy problem more acute in this country, raising
some fundamental issues of civil liberties. The direct confronta-
tion of a criminal defendant by the powerful office of the
prosecutor requires the development of restraints upon the pos-
sible abuses of power. . . .With the increase in the number of
criminal statutes, double jeopardy protection has become virtu-
ally indispensable."2
The potential for abuse has also been discussed elsewhere, generat-
ing similar warnings:
Double jeopardy was designed to thwart government tyranny. A
disgruntled prosecutor or an inflamed democracy can be just as
tyrannical a monarch.
The profusion of modern statutory offense categories has given
the prosecutor vast discretion at every stage of the criminal pro-
cess. He may characterize, at will, the same criminal behavior
as one or many offenses.2"
It is argued that each generation must define the basis for such pol-
icy.2 4 However, most lawyers agree that a number of fundamental
principles have completely unfolded. As Associate Justice Powell
summarized for the Supreme Court a decade ago:
[t]he Fifth Amendment double jeopardy guarantee serves princi-
Covino, supra note 12, at 83; Covino, The Big Goodbye, CAL. MAG., Nov., 1986, at 78.
21. J.A. SIGLER, DOUBLE JEOPARDY, THE DEVELOPMENT OF A LEGAL AND SOCIAL
POLICY 34-35 (1969); cf Comment, Twice in Jeopardy, 75 YALE L.J. 262 (1965).
22. J.A. SIGLER, supra note 21, at 227.
23. Comment, supra note 21, at 292, 304.
24. J.A. SIGLER, supra note 21, at 37.
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pally as a restraint on courts and prosecutors. The legislature
remains free under the Double Jeopardy Clause to define
crimes and fix punishments; but once the legislature has acted
courts may not impose more than one punishment for the same
offense and prosecutors ordinarily may not attempt to secure
that punishment in more than one trial.
If two offenses are the same . .. for purposes of barring con-
secutive sentences at a single trial, they necessarily will be the
same for purposes of barring successive prosecutions. Where the
judge is forbidden to impose cumulative punishment for two
crimes at the end of a single proceeding, the prosecutor is for-
bidden to strive for the same result in successive proceedings.2"
Determining what constitutes the "same" offense is perhaps the
most difficult task confronting prosecutors and judges. Legal fictions
abound for the purpose. Whether measured by the "same evidence,"
the "same transaction," or the "same act," reasonable minds differ in
the concrete application of interpretive standards to vaguely worded
statutes and complex factual issues. 2' However, as pointed out in
Brown v. Ohio, interpretive devices are not meant to create an iden-
tity crisis or to impose a judicial straight-jacket: "It has long been
understood that separate statutory crimes need not be identical, in
either constituent or in actual proof, in order to be the same within
the meaning of the constitutional prohibition."2 Indeed, where legis-
lation is unambiguous, interpretive guidelines have no force or effect
and legislative intent provides a foundation for determining whether
two offenses are the same for double jeopardy purposes.2"
Moreover, whether applied to cumulative punishment of greater
and lesser included offenses, or successive prosecutions for lesser and
greater crimes:
Whatever the sequence may be, the fifth amendment forbids
successive prosecution and cumulative punishment of a greater
and lesser included offense.
25. Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 165-66 (1977).
26. See Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299 (1932); J.A. SIGLER, supra note 21,
at 64; Comment, supra note 21, at 267-77.
27. Brown, 432 U.S. at 164 citing I J. BISHOP, NEW CRIMINAL LAW § 1051 (8th ed.
1892); Comment, supra note 21, at 268-69.
28. See Jeffers, 432 U.S. at 155-57; Lurz, 666 F.2d at 76; United States v. Arbelaez,
812 F.2d 530, 533-34 (9th Cir. 1987).
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The Double Jeopardy Clause is not such a fragile guarantee
that prosecutors can avoid its limitations by the simple expedi-
ent of dividing a single crime into a series of temporal or spatial
units.29
Of particular interest is one commentator's astute warning that
we should be vigilant for double jeopardy violations where multiple
conspiracies are alleged:
Although the drafting of the indictment is extremely important,
it is especially significant when conspiracy charges are added to
other substantive counts. Federal attorneys have been most
adept in the use of conspiracy charges to secure more ease in
utilizing evidence, to avoid the statute of limitations, to obtain
more and easier double convictions, and to bolster their personal
reputation for diligence."
This point requires special consideration. The Braverman holding,
cited in Brown, emphasizes that:
Whether the object of a single agreement is to commit one or
many crimes, it is in either case that agreement which consti-
tutes the conspiracy which the [conspiracy] statute punishes.
The one agreement cannot be taken to be several agreements
and hence several conspiracies because it envisages the violation
of several statutes rather than one."1
Consequently, while the "great range of choices presented to the
prosecution is due to the multiplication of legislatively created crimi-
nal categories," double jeopardy violations are not lessened because
they arise from this wellspring.3" The double jeopardy clause pro-
vides a judicial tool for restraining prosecutors' from pursuing
multiple punishments for the same offense. It particularly inhibits a
prosecutor's use of easier standards of proof under the CCE while
restricting sentencing decisions in the trial court. 3
Specifically, double jeopardy problems arise when a prosecutor
attempts to initially use a section 846 violation (conspiracy to dis-
tribute heroin) as the predicate felony required by section 848(b)(1)
and then use the violation again as part of the continuing "series" of
"violations" under section 848(b)(2). In Felix Mitchell's case, fed-
29. Brown, 432 U.S. at 169; cf. Braverman v. United States, 317 U.S. 49, 52 (1942).
30. J.A. SIG.E, supra note 21, at 171-72.
31. Braverman, 317 U.S. at 53.
32. J.A. SIGLER, supra note 21, at 64.
33. See Brown, 432 U.S. at 164, 166; seeJeffers, 432 U.S. at 155-157; see also Garrett,
471 U.S. at 785; see generally United States v. Kissel, 173 F.2d 823, 827 (S.D.N.Y. 1909).
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eral attorneys alleged nearly two dozen overt acts in furtherance of a
section 846 conspiracy to distribute heroin. Pursuing its theory of
vicarious liability, 4 the government alleged that the acts of any 69
Mob co-conspirator were also attributable to Mitchell.
Assuming arguendo that the general rule of vicarious conspiracy
liability also applies to CCE litigation,8 and that a series of three or
more violations need not be convictions, 6 the government alleged
that the identical overt acts of Mitchell's lieutenants were attributa-
ble to him as the Kingpin. The acts of Mitchell's lieutenants were
then used to establish the predicate and series violations under
sections 848(b)(1) and (b)(2). In other words, the overt acts of co-
conspirators that furthered the 69 Mob's distribution conspiracy
were not only part of Mitchell's section 848(b)(1) predicate offense,
but were also used to establish his three violations for purposes of
section 848(b)(2).
In point of fact, during the appeals of Mitchell's co-defendants,
the United States Attorney characterized the 69 Mob case as
presenting "a single-continuous conspiracy."3" If, as the government
claimed in Mitchell's own appeal, this single-continuous conspiracy
"is the very essence of a section 848 predicate . . ., consistent with
the general design of the statute,""8 then proof of the one conspiracy
not only exposed Mitchell to double punishment for the same
offense, but to multiple, successive prosecutions on the same elements
of liability. The identical overt acts used to show a "single-continu-
ous" section 846 conspiracy were subsumed in the predicate felony
offense of section 848(b)(1) and then borrowed to establish the sub-
section (b)(2) "continuing series of violations."
There is no doubt that proving overt acts in furtherance of an
unlawful agreement may facilitate conspiracy convictions of drug-
dealing lieutenants. On the other hand, unless the government
charges and proves either individual substantive violations, or a sepa-
rate conspiracy against the CCE Kingpin, the government may not
rely upon the predicate conspiracy to establish CCE liability. In the
absence of an independent substantive violation or a separate con-
34. See Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640 (1946).
35. Losada, 674 F.2d at 174-75; United States v. Jones, 763 F.2d 518, 525 (2d Cir.
1985).
36. Valenzuela, 596 F.2d at 1364-67; Ordonez, 722 F.2d at 537.
37. See Appellee's (Consolidated) Brief at 49:10-11; U.S. v. Randy Lamont Patterson et
al., (9th Cir. filed June 30, 1986) (No. 85-1236-85-1239).




spiracy charge, the government would be forced to: (1) refrain from
charging a CCE violation; or (2) risk reversal due to a fifth amend-
ment double jeopardy violation. It is important to note that "What
lies at the heart of the Double Jeopardy Clause is the prohibition
against multiple prosecutions for 'the same offense.'-"9
When the identical acts of a section 846 conspiracy are used to
establish the predicate and series violations of a CCE conviction, the
fifth amendment would appear to bar such overlapping legislative
categories. Furthermore, manipulation of a section 846 conspiracy to
prove a section 848 conspiracy violates the prohibitions against suc-
cessive, multiple prosecution for the same offense."0 A "successive"
prosecution for the same offense may occur in a single legal proceed-
ing if, as in Mitchell's case, the second (848) conviction depends
upon first establishing and then borrowing the contingent elements
from the first (846) conviction.
As the following discussion demonstrates, there are well-estab-
lished double jeopardy rules germane to all cases. These rules
provide protection against multiple, successive prosecutions and cu-
mulative punishments. They apply whether the abridgement occurs
at a single trial or in multiple actions. In two recent CCE cases, the
Supreme Court pointed out there are no exceptions to these rules for
"complex statutory crimes." 1
III. SUPREME COURT ESTABLISHES THE GROUND RULES FOR
CCE PROSECUTIONS
In the first CCE case before the Supreme Court, Garland
Jeffers was the alleged head of a drug organization in Gary, Indi-
ana. The organization produced revenue of $5,000 a day and netted
39. Jeffers, 432 U.S. at 150.
40. See id. at 153-54; Braverman, 317 U.S. at 53.
41. Jeffers, 432 U.S. at 150-51. It may be worthwhile to dispel doubts about the use of
other separately proved substantive drug offenses under the Act. True substantive violations
are not only cumulatively punishable to an 848, but the Supreme Court has also "caution[ed]
against ready transposition of the 'lesser included offense' principles of double jeopardy...,"
where the substantive offenses are not part of a single course of conduct, such as, part of the
same 846 conspiracy charge. See Garrett, 471 U.S. at 778-86, 789-95. Similarly, independent
conspiracy convictions are distinguishable violations and have been upheld as not abridging the
double jeopardy clause when used to prove a section 848 violation, (Boldin, 772 F.2d at 730-
32; But see Brantley, 733 F.2d at 1436 n.14 (wherein the prosecution proved two distinct
conspiracies even though they involved some of the same participants); United States v.
Guthrie, 789 F.2d 356, 358-60 (5th Cir. 1986); Lurz, 666 F.2d at 76; United States v. Crum-
pier, 636 F. Supp. 396, 410-12 (N.D. Ind. 1986)), because they are not part of a single course
of conduct. See Garrett, 471 U.S. at 789-95.
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$1,000,000 over a two-year period, 1972-74.4' Two indictments
were returned against Jeffers. The first indictment charged him with
a section 846 conspiracy to distribute heroin and a section 841 sub-
stantive distribution offense. The second indictment charged him
with operating a continuing criminal enterprise. The government
moved to join the indictments at one trial under the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure 8 and 13. They argued that the offenses were of
the same or similar character, based upon the same acts or transac-
tions and part of a common scheme or plan. Ironically, the
government, as in Felix Mitchell's case, also claimed that sections
846 and 848 are wholly separate offenses for double jeopardy
purposes.' 8
Jeffers and his nine co-defendants initially objected to trying the
section 846 case with the section 848 case because neither the parties
nor the charges were the same. Of the seventeen overt acts charged
in the conspiracy, Jeffers was involved in ten. Accordingly, Jeffers
argued that much of the conspiracy evidence would not be admissible
against him in the CCE case. The trial court denied the govern-
ment's joinder motion, setting the stage for Jeffers' first trial on the
conspiracy count. (Thus, unlike Mitchell's case, there was no need
for Jeffers' co-defendants to move for severance to avoid prejudicial
association with the Kingpin.) Prior to the second trial, Jeffers
moved to dismiss the CCE case against him as violative of the double
jeopardy clause. He anticipated a possible waiver argument by
claiming his objection to joinder was based upon his sixth amend-
ment right to a fair trial. He argued that a waiver "would amount to
penalizing the exercise of one constitutional right by denying
another.""
The Jeffers Court did not decide whether the double jeopardy
clause is violated by the use of identical facts to prove both a section
846 conspiracy and a section 848 conspiracy. The Jeffers Court re-
fused to consider the point. Under vigorous protest, the plurality
held Jeffers waived the argument by acceding to separate trials.'8
42. Government estimates of Oakland's 69th Avenue Mob profits are as high as $25,000
a day, allegedly producing several millions of dollars in profits over a six-year period, 1976-
1982. See Setterberg, Drugs and Justice in Oakland, CAL. LAW., May, 1986, at 36, 38; cf.
Covino, How the 69th Avenue Mob Maximized Earnings in East Oakland, CAL. MAG., Nov.
1985, at 83, 85.
43. Jeffers, 432 U.S. at 144; Appellee's Brief, supra note 37, at 23-26.
44. Jeffers, 432 U.S. at 144.
45. Id. at 153-54. This rare exception should be considered limited to the facts of the
case; under other circumstances an appellate court may decide to review a double jeopardy
argument raised for the first time on appeal. See, e.g., United States v. Gunter, 546 F.2d 861,
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Consequently, the Jeffers waiver exception deterred the
Supreme Court from fully addressing the specific issue presented by
Felix Mitchell's case. Nevertheless, Justice White disagreed and dis-
sented "because the conspiracy proved was not used to establish the
continuing criminal enterprise .. "46 While the Supreme Court
did not decide the propriety of using a section 846 conspiracy to
prove a section 848 conspiracy, a number of their comments are
worth noting. The United States Supreme Court's opinion strongly
suggest that such use would violate the successive prosecution aspect
of the fifth amendment.
First, the Court stated that punishing Jeffers for the section
846 and 848 conspiracies violated the prohibition against double
punishment. The Court's rationale was premised upon their conclu-
sion that the offenses were "the 'same offense' for double jeopardy
purposes."'47 The Supreme Court considered section 846 as being a
lesser included offense of section 848. "As this discussion makes
clear, the reason for separate penalties for conspiracies lies in the
additional dangers posed by concerted activity. Section 848, however,
already expressly prohibits this kind of conduct."4
The fact that the Jeffers court held that cumulative punishment
violative of double jeopardy does not preclude consideration of per-
suasive dicta on CCE proof if such dicta helps to identify a multiple,
successive prosecution violation. On the contrary, there may be situa-
tions where a lesser-included-offense instruction to the jury will ob-
viate double jeopardy problems, or at least preserve violations for
review.49
However, any palliative effects would have been useless in
Mitchell's case. The Mitchell jury was instructed differently from
the jury in Jeffers. After returning a guilty verdict on the 846 con-
spiracy, the Mitchell jury was specifically instructed to consider the
conspiracy verdict as the predicate offense in its deliberations on
proof of the 848(b)(1) elements. They were then instructed to rum-
mage through the other overt acts to find the three additional
violations required for proof of subsection (b)(2). A lesser-included-
offense instruction was not given. In the words of the trial judge, "it
seems to me this is all very confusing . . .[and] I think the better
procedure, and practice, is just to set aside the conviction if they con-
864-65 (10th Cir. 1977); cf, FED. R. CRIM. PROC., 52(b).
46. Jeffers, 432 U.S. at 158.
47. Id. at 155.
48. Id. at 157.
49. See id. at 154.
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vict on both."" 0
The trial judge's reasoning was incorrect. Setting aside the con-
spiracy conviction admitted only the cumulative punishment
violation; it did not account for the 'confusing' multiple-successive
prosecution branch of double jeopardy protection. The error is criti-
cal because, unlike Garland Jeffers, Felix Mitchell was not charged
and convicted of any other substantive offense that might have been
used as an "alternative" predicate to affirm judgment on appeal.
At the very outset of the Jeffers opinion the Supreme Court
flatly rejected the government's argument that a section 846 conspir-
acy and a section 848 CCE violation "create two separate offenses
under the 'same evidence' test of Blockburger."5 The Jeffers Court
stressed "this would be a simple case" if an agreement was not an
essential element of both offenses.5" Eschewing analogy to a case re-
lied on by the government and the court of appeals, wherein a pur-
ported equivalent statute used the word "involved," the Supreme
Court stated that such interpretive "flexibility does not exist with
respect to the continuing criminal enterprise statute.". 3 In fact, ac-
cording to the Supreme Court, the CCE statute (848(b)(2)(A))
clearly requires that all violations must be undertaken "in concert
with" five or more persons. Additionally, after closely examining the
legislative history of the CCE statute and many other federal statu-
tory schemes using the key phrase "in concert," the Court concluded:
"Since the word 'concert' commonly signifies agreement of two or
more persons in a common plan or enterprise, a clearly articulated
statement from Congress to the contrary would be necessary before
that meaning would be abandoned."
'54
The Supreme Court assumed, for the sake of argument, that
section 848 requires the same essential "agreement" as does 846 and
is the "same" offense for double jeopardy purposes. The Court then
noted how the Jeffers' indictments actually compared: "[tlhe two in-
dictments in this case are remarkably similar in detail. It is clear
that the identical agreement and transactions over the identical time
period were involved in the two cases. '
50. DC Nor. Cal. CR-83-130-1-MHP, RT 29A, p. 229:14-15 (N.D. Cal. CR-83-130-
1-MHP).
51. Jeffers, 432 U.S. at 147.
52. Id. at 147, 149-50.
53. Id. at 147-48.
54. Id. at 148 n.14.
55. Id. at 150 n.16. Again, the United States claimed its prosecution of Mitchell did not
violate double jeopardy, although it insisted it had proved a "single-continuous conspiracy,"
also claiming "an underlying conspiracy is the very essence of a section 848 predicate." See
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Following the reasoning in Brown v. Ohio,5 referring to
Braverman v. United States,5  decided the same day as Jeffers v.
United States," and cited therein, it appears that as early as 1978 an
indictment alleging "a single-continuous [8461 conspiracy" should be
considered the same offense as an 848 offense for all double jeopardy
purposes. There are no exceptions to fundamental double jeopardy
rules for complex statutory crimes and "agreement" is the essential
component of both 846 and 848 enterprises. Therefore, Jeffers makes
it clear that borrowing an 846 offense to convict an 848 Kingpin
begs for double jeopardy reversal. 9
A. Some Persuasive Dicta
Shoring up the analysis of double jeopardy problems presented
by conspiracy/CCE prosecutions and following the reasoning in
Jeffers, Maryland Circuit Judge Francis D. Murnaghan observed in
United States v. Lurz:60
While prosecution for conspiracy to commit two crimes, based
on proof of but a single conspiracy, infringes a defendant's pro-
tection against being twice in jeopardy, the rule does not apply
where there are two distinct conspiracies, even though they may
involve some of the same participants.61
Raymond Lurz's section 848 conviction was deemed valid. However,
it was based upon a separately proved conspiracy, permissible to
establish only one of the series violations needed for a 848 (b)(2)
conviction. It was not based upon the crucial "predicate" federal fel-
ony of (b)(1). 62 However, Judge Murnaghan concluded, consistent
with Jeffers:
One may not first prove a conspiracy to distribute to establish a
section 846 violation, and then move on to convict under section
848 as well, by using the very same conspiracy to distribute for
the felony violation of the federal narcotics laws (item one in the
notes 37-38 and accompanying text. In less appealing terms, the United States regurgitated
warmed-over Blockburger arguments, contending the two offenses were not the same for
double jeopardy purposes. This proposition was explicitly rejected in the Jeffers case. See
Jeffers, 432 U.S. at 147. See also Appellee's (Consolidated) Brief, supra note 37.
56. Jeffers, 432 U.S. at 164, 169.
57. Braverman, 317 U.S. at 52.
58. Jeffers, 432 U.S. at 150-51.
59. Id. at 155-57.
60. Lurz, 666 F.2d at 69 (4th Cir. 1981).
61. Id. at 74 (citations omitted). See, e.g., United States v. Papa, 533 F.2d 815, 821-22
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 961 (1976).
62. Lurz, 666 F.2d at 76; cf supra note 41.
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five point scheme)."
Shortly after Lurz, the Seventh Circuit accepted the reasoning
of the Fourth Circuit opinion in its own dicta: "[S]ubstantive
offenses may serve as predicate offenses for a conviction under sec-
tion 848, while a conspiracy offense under section 846 may not." ' ,
However, it is interesting to note that the dicta in Jefferson,
affirming the Lurz Court's analysis and implicitly relying on a fair
reading of Jeffers," did not deter the court from writing: "A defend-
ant can be jointly tried on multiple narcotics charges arising from the
same act or acts without raising a double jeopardy question, even if
some of the alleged felonies are lesser-included offenses of the
others.""
Thus, according to the Lurz and Jefferson Courts, there is a
valid distinction to be drawn between one trial on several similar
narcotics counts and an 846 to prove an 848. It was deemed accept-
able to concurrently try a defendant for both 846 and 848 offenses
with proper instructions. However, that did not mean that an 846
could be used either as the predicate to prove an 848, or to punish
consecutively. 7
Similarly, at least two Fifth Circuit decisions recognized the
import of the Jeffers dicta, noting, "Section 848 is a conspiracy-type
statute."" In United States v. Stricklin," the court went so far as to
write:
A double jeopardy defense will lie where the government has
previously prosecuted a defendant under either section 846 or
section 848 and then seeks to prosecute him again on the basis
of the same criminal agreement under the other statute.
Whatever the sequence may be, the Fifth Amendment forbids
successive prosecution and cumulative penalties for a greater
and lesser included offense.
70
However, each decision affirmed an 848 conviction based upon alter-
native substantive or separate conspiracy convictions which are
63. 666 F.2d at 76.
64. United States v. Jefferson, 714 F.2d 689, 702 n.27 (7th Cir. 1983), cert. granted
and judgment vacated on other grounds, 106 S. Ct. 41, opn. on remand, 782 F.2d 697
(1986); see Lurz, 666 F.2d at 69. But see Chiattello, 804 F.2d 415, 420 (7th Cir. 1986).
65. Jefferson, 714 F.2d at 703-05 n.29.
66. Id. at 703 (citations omitted).
67. See Jefferson, 714 F.2d at 703; Lurz, 666 F.2d at 76; see alsoJeffers, 432 U.S. at
154, 157.
68. United States v. Phillips, 664 F.2d 971, 1013 (5th Cir. 1981).
69. 591 F.2d 1112 (5th Cir. 1979).
70. Id. (citing Brown, 432 U.S. at 169).
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supportive of the predicate offense.7 1
Accordingly, the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Jeffers led
many lower courts to conclude that an 846 violation could not be
punished cumulatively with an 848 violation. This key point was
underplayed as "dicta" by one court of appeals. 72 However, the
point was again reiterated by then Associate Justice William
Rehnquist who wrote in Garrett that the Jeffers "plurality reasona-
bly concluded that the dangers posed by a conspiracy and a CCE
were similar and thus there would be little purpose in cumulating
the penalties."'7 3
The Ninth Circuit accepted the same general view in two pun-
ishment cases, one preceding Garrett and one following it:
Because the section 848 and section 846 conspiracy charge are
the same offenses for double jeopardy purposes ...we vacate
the section 846 sentences for counts one and six, which run con-
secutively to the section 848 CCE sentence. However, we affirm
the consecutive sentences for the violations of both section 848
and its predicate offense.7
Moreover, in Garrett the Supreme Court specifically held that
all other so-called "substantive" felonies under the Controlled Sub-
stances Act can be punished consecutively to a CCE offense without
violating the fifth amendment's double jeopardy protection.7 '
Recalling that the principal focus of Jeffers was the permissibility of
cumulative punishment for an 846 and 848 conspiracy, the Garrett
Court once again concluded 846 and 848 are the same offenses for
double jeopardy purposes. Therefore, cumulative punishment was
prohibited.76
The significance of Garrett is that the Supreme Court
delineated the other substantive offenses under the Act apart from
conspiracy.77 The disjointed drug ventures of Jonathan Garrett could
71. Cf Boldin, 772 F.2d at 730-31 (Boldin attempted to persuade the court that his
prior convictions were a bar based on the double jeopardy rule. The court of appeals restated
their holding from the original Boldin).
72. See Young, 745 F.2d at 750. The "dicta" was explicitly affirmed by the Supreme
Court in Garrett, 471 U.S. at 786.
73. Garrett, 727 F.2d 1003, af'd, 471 U.S. 773, 785.
74. United States v. Burt, 765 F.2d 1364, 1368 (9th Cir. 1985) (emphasis added); see
also United States v. Smith, 690 F.2d 748, 750 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1041
(1983). See infra note 77.
75. See supra note 41.
76. Garrett, 471 U.S. at 794.
77. The Ninth Circuit appears to have recognized the difference between a valid sub-
stantive offense for use as a "predicate" and the dubious use of section 846 violation. Burt, 765
F.2d at 1369. Chief Judge Robert F. Peckham wrote that even though Young appears to him
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not be considered to form a single course of conduct for a lesser-
included-offense argument. The Supreme Court concluded that even
though conspiracy and CCE are the same for double jeopardy
purposes:
The same is not true of the substantive offenses created by the
Act and conspiracy, and by the same logic, it is not true of the
substantive offenses and CCE. We have been required in the
present case, as we were not in Jeffers, to consider the relation-
ship between substantive predicate offenses and CCE. We think
here logic supports the conclusion, also indicated by the legisla-
tive history, that Congress intended separate punishments for
the underlying substantive predicates and for the CCE offense.
Congress may, of course, so provide if it wishes. 8
For the six years after Jeffers was decided it was reasonable to
assume the Supreme Court determined section 846 to be the same
offense as section 848 for double jeopardy purposes. As Lurz,
Jefferson and to a lesser extent Phillips and Stricklin demonstrate,
the point was not lost on a number of appellate court judges. Al-
though the lack of a direct holding on the issue in Jeffers appears to
have caused many judges to balk at following suit, it has subse-
quently caused others to retreat from their positions. 9 As noted in
this article's Introduction, the double jeopardy question in the con-
text of proving a section 848 violation with a section 846 predicate,
has not been addressed by all circuits.8"
The Fifth and Ninth Circuits have recognized the problem, but
they have found alternative resolutions.81 The Eleventh Circuit has
its own conflict of decisions." The Fourth Circuit, sitting en banc,
recently retracted its Lurz dicta, holding, without explication, "the
government may rely on a section 846 violation to establish a section
848 offense .. "88 The Fourth Circuit's decision followed the Sec-
ond Circuit precedent that will be discussed in the next section.
A panel of the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals had remanded
to be the "better result," indications are that "the Ninth Circuit might not allow use of con-
spiracy as a predicate offense, if called upon to decide." United States v. Zavala, 622 F. Supp.
319, 327 (N.D. Cal. 1985).
78. Garrett, 471 U.S. at 794.
79. See Ricks 11, 802 F.2d at 737.
80. See supra note 13.
81. See, e.g., Stricklin, 591 F.2d at 1123 (5th Cir.), reh'g denied, 598 F.2d 620 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 963 (1979); Phillips, 664 F.2d at 1008-13; Michel, 588 F.2d at
1000-01; United States v. Sterling, 742 F.2d 521 (1984); Zavala, 622 F.2d at 327.
82. Brantley, 733 F.2d at 1436 n.14; Boldin, 772 F.2d at 730-31.
83. Ricks 11, 802 F.2d at 737.
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previously, stating it would decide whether a double jeopardy viola-
tion occurred "if we were persuaded that the section 846 conspiracy
conviction may not serve as one of the three requisite narcotics viola-
tions. .. "84 In a footnote to Ricks I, the Court discussed Garrett
and emphasized that it believed there was a distinction between the
use of a section 846 offense as one of the three "series" violations
under section 848(b)(2) and using it as the (b)(1) predicate.85 In
Ricks II no such distinction was made, although it is worth noting
that the appellant appears to have been convicted of two substantive
841 counts of distribution.86
Consequently, the Fourth Circuit must now be considered to
have been "persuaded" to join the Second Circuit camp. Other
courts have followed the Second Circuit's lead without discussion,
contributing nothing to the understanding of how the Supreme
Court's decisions in Jeffers, Garrett, Brown and Braverman can be
so readily discarded.87
B. None So Blind as Those Who Refuse to See
Indeed, as if "hidden in the open," Professor Karl Llwellyn's
observation on judicial myopia seems an apt prelude to consideration
of the lead decision that obfuscated Jeffers and caused CCE law to
meander on its wayward course:
I suspect that eyes trained to read an opinion not for the how of
the deciding but only for the last word of doctrine on a point
may well slide over this type of revelation as merely obiter, as
almost in the way ("obiter" will stand that rendering), at most
as a sort of obligato which may add to the aesthetic quality but
hardly to the firm stuff of the decision.8
In United States v. Young,89 New York Circuit Judge George
84. United States v. Ricks, 776 F.2d 455, 464 (5th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct.
650 (1986) [hereinafter Ricks I].
85. Id. at 464 n.16.
86. See id. at 458, 462; see Ricks I, 802 F.2d at 732.
87. See infra notes 95.101 and accompanying text. Ricks I1 also says other "sister cir-
cuits" (First and Eleventh) have followed suit (Ricks 11, 802 F.2d at 737), but clearly the First
Circuit decision is without much weight, since it also neglected to considerJeffers and simply
announced section 846 violation can be used to prove an 848 violation. United States v. Mid-
dleton, 673 F.2d 31, 33 (1st Cir. 1982). Furthermore, as pointed out elsewhere in this article,
the Eleventh Circuit is in the midst of its own internal conflict. Brantley, 733 F.2d at 1436
n.14; Boldin, 772 F.2d at 730-32; United States v. Rosenthal, 793 F.2d 1214-26 (11th Cir.
1986).
88. K. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION, DECIDING APPEALS 141 (1960).
89. Young, 745 F.2d at 733.
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C. Pratt conducted a review of relevant precedent, including Jeffers,
Lurz and Jefferson. He decided that section 846 could be used as the
predicate offense in proving the CCE. This decision gave very little
credence to the "how" of the Jeffers decision9° and it is no surprise
that the Young Court found its own inquiry of legislative intent to be
convincing:
To begin with, the statutory language is unambiguous. Section
848(a)(1) provides that any felony violation of Subchapters I
and II of Chapter 13 of Title 21 is an eligible predicate, and
nothing in the text of either section 848 or section 846 suggests
that although a section 846 conspiracy is such a felony it does
not qualify as a predicate for a section 848 charge. The refer-
ence in section 848 to "any" felony violation of the narcotics
laws does not mean "any felony violation except a section 846
conspiracy.""1
The very cursory treatment given the Lurz and Jefferson opin-
ions, described as having "briefly touched on the question," suggests
there may have been something amiss in the reasoning of the Young
Court.9" Ignoring Jeffers, the Young Court decided that a section 846
offense was a lesser included offense of section 848. However, this
did not preclude the use of a section 846 offense as a predicate to
prove a section 848 conspiracy.9" The Young Court analogized to
RICO litigation and determined that the clear legislative intent was
to allow "any" felony to act as a predicate, including conspiracy.
The Court then reached the following conclusion:
In actuality, however, these elements [848(a)(1) and (a)(2)]
overlap, since the (a)(1) felony violation must be part and parcel
of the (a)(2) continuing series. The overlap may take on an
added dimension when a section 846 conspiracy is used as one
of the predicate felonies, but the fact that the entire series must
be carried out "in concert" is no reason to prevent a section 846
violation from qualifying as one of the series.9'
There are several reasons why this conclusion, which is accepted by
the Sixth and Fourth Circuits, is faulty.9 6
90. Id. at 750.
91. Id. (emphasis original).
92. Id. at 749.
93. Id. at 750.
94. Id. at 751.
95. See supra text accompanying note 87 and infra text accompanying note 102; see




The critical error in the Second Circuit's Young decision is that
it does not account for the Supreme Court's own legislative analysis
in Jeffers. Judge Pratt's casual reference to an "added dimension"
caused by using a section 846 conspiracy to prove a section 848
offense earmarks an absence of recognition. The premise that a sec-
tion 846 offense is legislatively like "any [other] felony," is followed
by the conclusion it is not barred as a predicate simply because "the
entire series must be carried out 'in concert'. . .. "" Thus, the
Young Court's ruling was in error when viewed in light of the
Supreme Court's statement about the overriding legislative intent in
Jeffers (subsequently affirmed in Garrett)."
Further, in Jeffers, the Supreme Court rejected reference to
Blockburger double jeopardy guidelines, or comparative statutory
methods, as in Ianelli v. United States."" A section 846 violation was
declared the same offense as a section 848 violation for double jeop-
ardy purposes, precisely because the Supreme Court found that
Congress expressly intended that both crimes contain the same essen-
tial conspiracy components. Therefore, reference to other passages' in
section 848, equivalent statutes, or interpretive tests, was deemed
unnecessary."9
Moreover, the Garrett decision went beyond explicitly affirming
the so-called Jeffers cumulative-punishment "dicta." Implicit in its
discussion of the distinguishing features of all other true "substan-
tive" offenses under the Act from a section 846 conspiracy is the
logical assumption that section 846 is excluded from the "any fel-
ony" predicate category for purposes of subdivision (a)(1) of section
848.100
Consequently, since the Young Court failed to account for what
must be considered the superseding aspects of the legislature's "in
concert" language, its own legislative inquiry is without persuasive
effect. In point of fact, the Young Court's analysis of the purported
legislative intent of section 848 (b)(1) and its comparison to RICO,
96. Young, 745 F.2d at 751.
97. To briefly reiterate what Jeffers stated: "an examination of the language of CCE
legislation revealed that the violations undertaken in the continuing criminal enterprise must
be 'in concert' with others. Therefore, it is virtually the same as a section 846 conspiracy." The
CCE "signifies agreement of two or more persons in a common plan or enterprise, land] a
clearly articulated statement from Congress to the contrary would be necessary before that
meaning should be abandoned." Jeffers, 432 U.S. at 148 n.14 (emphasis added).
98. 420 U.S. 770 (1975); seeJeffers, 432 U.S. at 147-48; see also Lurz, 666 F.2d at 76.
99. Jeffers, 432 U.S. at 147-48; Brown, 432 U.S. at 164.
100. See supra note 41; see also Garrett, 471 U.S. at 785, 794; but see Young, 745 F.2d
at 750 (wherein contradictory language is presented by the court).
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is problematical at best and illegitimate at worst. The decision, fol-
lowed without comment in the Sixth Circuit, 0 ' and now silently
accepted as "persuasive" by the Fourth Circuit,0 2 is wrong and has
created a deep chasm, prompting a "split of authority."
However, since Young, the Seventh and Ninth Circuits have
noted the decision with apparent consternation. The question of
whether they should alter course was not reached because either the
issue was not preserved for review, 03 or multiple, "fall-back" felony
convictions made reliance on section 846 unnecessary.' 0 '
C. The Government's Equivocal Positions
If the circuits can be considered divided at this time, the U.S.
Attorney could well be diagnosed as suffering from a split
personality.
For example, in United States v. Jones,'0 5 apparently litigated
in the lower courts prior to the Young case, the New York office of
the U.S. Attorney "agreed that the section 846 count [could] not be
used as a predicate. . . ."'06 In the Ninth Circuit, the year prior to
return of the Mitchell indictment, the San Francisco office had "con-
cede[d] that Smith's conviction for conspiracy under 21 U.S.C.
section 846 and for continuing criminal enterprise under 21 U.S.C.
section 848 violates the double jeopardy clause ... . Similarly,
in the Lurz case (Fourth Circuit), the government conceded the
"well-settled principle," referred to in Brown v. Ohio.'08 This prin-
cipal is that the government could not try the greater section 848
offense after a conviction on the lesser included section 846
offense.' o'
It is certainly arguable that the U.S. Attorney's office should
have learned its lessons from the Supreme Court in Jeffers. This is
particularly true since Jeffers rejected the Blockburger argument that
section 846 and section 848 are separate offenses and revealed a clear
101. Schuster, 769 F.2d at 345.
102. Ricks !I, 802 F.2d at 737.
103. United States v. Cerro, 775 F.2d 908, 911 (7th Cir. 1985); United States v.
Markowski, 772 F.2d 358, 361 (7th Cir. 1985).
104. Chiattello, 804 F.2d at 420; Sterling, 742 F.2d at 526; Zavala, 622 F. Supp. at
326-27.
105. 763 F.2d 518 (2d Cir. 1985).
106. See id. at 525.
107. Smith, 690 F.2d at 750.
108. 432 U.S. at 169; cf infra note 113 (the court denied double jeopardy bar when
overlapping proof was required to show different crimes).
109. Lurz, 666 F.2d at 75 n.10.
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legislative intent.110 Nonetheless,. the Mitchell case proves that the
government was either unaware of the import of Jeffers and care-
lessly prosecuted him, or persisted in believing the prosecution was
valid. Young, Schuster and Ricks H, give the impression that the risk
was indemnified, but those cases provide a false sense of security.
Indeed, in the Seventh Circuit where Jefferson was decided, the
U.S. Attorney has recently allowed trial court dismissal of a CCE
count which was alleged on a section 846 predicate, without chal-
lenge on appeal."' Similarly, in United States v. Markowski,"2 the
Second Circuit stated that although the "prosecutor . . .changed his
mind on appeal, arguing that a conviction for conspiracy under 21
U.S.C. section 846 also may be a predicate offense,""' 3 the govern-
ment waived its argument by conceding at trial that three or more
alternative substantive offenses must be proved in a CCE case.""
In short, because the government has not presented a granite
profile in this aspect of CCE litigation, it achieved a very vulnerable
conviction in the Mitchell case.
IV. CONCLUSION
The purpose of this article is to unravel the origins of a "split
authority" in the federal circuits regarding the use of section 846 as
the predicate offense in proving a section 848 crime. The division is
apocryphal. If nothing else, the Supreme Court's legislative analysis
in Jeffers, reaffirmed in Garrett, is convincing authority that using
section 846 to prove a section 848 crime violates the double jeopardy
clause of the fifth amendment. Bolstered by sound, direct follow-up
dicta from Lurz in the Fourth Circuit and Stricklin and Phillips in
the Fifth Circuit, federal review courts warned that a CCE prosecu-
tion based solely upon a "single-continuous conspiracy" would
violate the double jeopardy clause at the time the Mitchell indictment
was returned.
Indeed, it is worth reiterating that in Brown" 5 and Lurz,"
both courts noted the tendency for multiple, overlapping conspiracy
110. Jeffers, 432 U.S. at 144 n.9, 147-50; cf. Lurz, 666 F.2d at 76.
111. Cerro, 775 F.2d at 909-10.
112. 772 F.2d 358 (7th Cir. 1985).
113. Id. at 361 n.l.
114. The Mitchell jury was also instructed to find three or more "violations." However,
the Mitchell jury was instructed to find these additional violations from the overt acts within
the predicate offense. See Michel, 588 F.2d at 1000 n.15.
115. 432 U.S. at 169.
116. 666 F.2d at 74.
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counts to. provoke remarkable double jeopardy flaws:
Whether the object of a single agreement is to commit one or
many crimes, it is in either case that agreement which consti-
tutes the conspiracy which the [conspiracy] statute punishes.
The one agreement cannot be taken to be several agreements
and hence several conspiracies because it envisages the violation
of several statutes rather than one.1
17
Thus, assuming the government proved a single-continuous
section 846 conspiracy against the 69 Mob, its seriatim use of the
identical conspiracy to prove Mitchell's section 848 "conspiracy" vio-
lated fifth amendment double jeopardy protection. Review of the
procedural postures of the Jeffers, Brown and Lurz cases supports
the conclusion that a double jeopardy violation may occur at separate
trials, or during one trial. The occurrence of "successive" prosecu-
tions at the same trial does not alter the fact that the government
first proved the section 846 conspiracy and then "move[d] on to con-
vict under section 848 as well. .... ,
The key to the Mitchell case and its interaction with double
jeopardy protection is that the prosecution may not rely on one con-
spiracy to prove the existence of another." 9
Moreover, it is instructive to recall that Felix Mitchell was con-
victed of the section 846 charge only. There was no net of alternative
substantive convictions to rely upon as a predicate to prove the sec-
tion 848 offense. Therefore, Mitchell's case is distinguishable from
all other reported cases.
19 0
Mitchell was not unlawfully sentenced to serve consecutive
terms for section 846 and 848 convictions. However, the double jeop-
ardy clause of the fifth amendment was violated by allowing succes-
sive use of a section 846 offense to establish the predicate offense of a
section 848(b)(1) violation. The fifth amendment violation was fur-
ther aggravated by instructing the jury to lift overt acts from the 846
conspiracy to prove the series of violations required by section
848(b)(2).
Indeed, it may be no exaggeration to say Felix Mitchell was not
twice placed in jeopardy for the same offense, he was thrice placed in
jeopardy.
117. Braverman, 317 U.S. at 53 (1942).
118. Lurz, 666 F.2d at 76; cf. Boldin, 772 F.2d at 731.
119. See Braverman, 317 U.S. at 53.
120. See, e.g., Sterling, 742 F.2d at 523; Zavala, 622 F. Supp. at 326-27; Michel, 588
F.2d at 1003.
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